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Abstract
Decoy state protocols are a useful tool for many quantum key distribution systems implemented
with weak coherent pulses, allowing significantly better secret bit rates and longer maximum dis-
tances. In this paper we present a method to numerically find optimal three-level protocols, and
we examine how the secret bit rate and the optimized parameters are dependent on various sys-
tem properties, such as session length, transmission loss, and visibility. Additionally, we show
how to modify the decoy state analysis to handle partially distinguishable decoy states as well as
uncertainty in the prepared intensities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a cryptographic protocol that allows two remote
parties (Alice and Bob) to generate a random key (a string of bits) so that only Alice and
Bob have any information about the key. The security of the system is guaranteed by
the laws of quantum mechanics unlike other key distribution schemes, such as public key
cryptography, that rely on assumed computational limitations of the attacker. The classic
QKD system is BB84 [1], which consists of a sender (Alice) sending a receiver (Bob) a
series of bit values encoded on qubits in one of two mutually unbiased bases. They only
keep the bit values where Bob measured in the same basis that Alice prepared the state in.
Provided that any eavesdropper (Eve) does not know the basis at the time of transmission,
she cannot gain any knowledge of the key Alice sent without introducing a disturbance
rate into the stream that Bob measures. Alice and Bob can then reveal a portion of their
bits to determine with high probability (asymptotically 1) that Eve was not present and
thus are assured of unconditional security. Of course, in non-ideal (real world) situations,
noise has to be accounted for, whether it is due to Eve or the physical apparatus. It has
been shown [2, 3, 4] that Alice and Bob can still be assured of unconditional security in
the presence of noise by implementing error correction and privacy amplification by way of
classical messages over an authenticated public channel.
There are also forms of attack that are based on the specifics of the physical protocol and
how they differ from the ideal BB84 protocol. One common physical difference is the use
of weak coherent light pulses for the encoded bits that Alice sends to Bob, instead of using
a qubit space. Since it is currently hard to create a steady deterministic source of single-
photon signals (SPS), phase-randomized coherent states with their Poisson distribution of
photon number are often used instead. The photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack takes
advantage of an inherent vulnerability in these types of signals, specifically the fact that
sometimes multiple photons are simultaneously prepared and sent with the same encoded
information. In a PNS attack, Eve performs a non-demolition measurement on the photon
number of each signal that Alice sends to Bob. When the number is greater than one, Eve
splits a photon off of the signal and stores it in quantum memory. After Bob has measured
the signal and revealed which basis he measured in, Eve can then measure in the same basis
and acquire full information on those signals without introducing any disturbance.
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In order to protect against this type of attack, Alice and Bob must place a bound on the
number of SPS that Bob received. Then, they must privacy amplify away all other signals. If
Alice prepares all of the signals from a single mean photon number (µ), conservative analysis
leads to a very loose bound and hence a significant reduction in secret bit rate and maximum
secure distance. Decoy states were proposed as a solution [5, 6, 7, 8] to boost performance
and have since been implemented experimentally [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. This is where
Alice creates multiple signal intensities (µj) and randomly varies between these intensities
when sending each signal to Bob. By looking at the number of signals of each level that reach
Bob, one can characterize a slice of how a channel behaves for a signal intensity µj. Since
each signal level gives a different slice, the decoy states better characterize the channel. This
means that they can place a much tighter bound on the SPS and thus acheive significantly
greater rates and maximum distances.
The rate of key generation is affected by several protocol parameters, namely the number
of decoy states, the intensity of each decoy state (µj), and the proportion of each decoy
state among the total signals sent. It is thus useful to form heuristics for determining their
optimal setting. These optimal parameters are in turn affected by the system parameters:
dark (and background) count rate (y0), signal visibility (V ), the session length in number of
signals that Alice sent (N), the security parameter (), and the channel characteristics. By
building on the formalism introduced in [8], this paper will present results from numerical
analysis of the effects of system parameters on the optimal decoy state protocols and their
associated rates. In Section II, we present our secret key generation rate formula and discuss
the decoy state optimization programs. In Section III, we show how we perform the global
search over system parameters and find the optimal decoy state scheme. Numerical results
detailing how the different system parameters affect the rate are presented in Section IV. We
then demonstrate how to carry out decoy state analysis either when the intensities are not
known exactly (Section V) or when the levels of the protocol are partially distinguishable
by an adversary (Section VI). Finally, we summarize the heuristics found in this work in
Section VII. Appendix A contains an argument concerning the validity of the decoy state
analysis regardless of whether the quantum channel is stationary or time-varying.
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II. CALCULATING THE RATE
For any given protocol, there is a simple linear program that can be used along with
some statistics from Bob’s data to place a tight bound on the number of SPS. There is also
a quadratic program to find a bound on the bit error rate (BER) of the SPS. In both cases
we consider the intensities µj to be known exactly; see Section V for a relaxation of this
assumption. The length of the secret key generated is the bound on the SPS plus the dark
counts [17] minus the amount of information revealed during the error-correction process
minus the amount of required privacy amplification. The following secret key rate formula
has a very similar form to that of GLLP [3], but its (composable) security is actually a finite
statistics derivation of Koashi’s security proof [18, 19], which will be published elsewhere.
For the numerical studies reported in this work we use:
K = RN =
∑
j
(
Sj +Dj − fEC · Cj ·H2(BER)− fPA · Sj ·H2(bmax1 )
)
, (1)
where the summation is only of the j’s that label signals that encode secret key bits, K is
the length of the key, R is the key rate, N is the session length measured in the number
of signals sent, Sj is the lower bound on the SPS and Dj is the lower bound on the dark
counts, Cj is the number of total signals that Bob received from decoy state j, H2(·) is
the binary Shannon entropy function and bmax1 is an upper bound on the bit error rate of
only the SPS. Efficiency factors fe.c. and fp.a. respectively relate how close error correction
and privacy amplification are to the Shannon limit. The simulations here use fEC = 1.2
and fPA = 1 + 1.53(b
max
1 )
−0.54S−0.44, where S =
∑
j Sj is the bound on the total number
of SPS contributing to the secret key. (The expression for fPA is a rough numerical fit we
found for calculating the number of typical strings needed to describe the output of a binary
symmetric channel with high confidence, as needed for computing privacy amplification in
Koashi’s approach [18].) Not every level needs to encode key bits; there can be levels acting
purely as decoys, which will contribute by bounding the SPS. In most of our simulations,
only one of the (usually three) levels is chosen to encode information for generating secret
key.
Prior to calculating the amount of required privacy amplfication, Alice and Bob will share
information on: the number of signals at each level sent by Alice (Nj :
∑
j Nj = N), the
number of signals at each level successfully received by Bob (Cj), and the number of errors
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on the sifted bits at each level (Ej). From this data, they must find the lower bound S and
the upper bound bmax1 .
A. Finding yields
Since Eve cannot distinguish between the decoy states except by means of the photon
number, the channel parameters that she can adjust can be varied independently for each
photon number, k. Define yk to be the probability that Bob gets a click at his detector
given that the click came from a k signal that Alice sent. y0 will encompass all dark and
background counts. If Eve does not apply a stationary channel the yk’s will be averaged
probabilities. See Appendix A for further details. To bound S, first we can bound the
probability, P , that Bob’s click came from a SPS or a dark count given that Alice sent a
signal of intensity µj. These probabilities are
P Sj = e
−µjµjy1 ,
PDj = e
−µjy0 . (2)
Since µj is fixed before the protocol begins and Eve is free to pick the values of all the
yk’s, the minimum probability, Pj, is found by ranging over optimization variables yk’s to
find the minimum subject to the statistics the Bob measured. Each signal, regardless of
whether it encodes information, adds a constraint:
Y −j ≤ e−µj
∞∑
k=0
yk
µkj
k!
≤ Y +j , (3)
where Y ± are upper and lower bounds on the overall yield of each decoy state. The maximum
likelihood of the overall yield for state j is
Cj
Nj
. The bounds are found such that with
probability greater that (1 − ) the true probability is greater than Y − and with the same
probability it is less than Y +. They can be calculated by using a standard function in
statistics, namely the inverse incomplete beta function.
If there are three decoy states, then when calculating each Pj, all three constraints are
imposed for each minimization. This is because Eve cannot change the channel based on
which decoy state Alice sent so the yk’s must be the same for all decoy states. The variable
bounds are 0 ≤ yk ≤ 1 since the yk’s are probabilities. The bar indicates a program variable.
5
Putting everything together gives two linear programs:
P Sj = e
−µjmin µjy1 (4)
subject to:
Y −j ≤ e−µj
∞∑
k=0
yk
µkj
k!
≤ Y +j ∀j
0 ≤ yk ≤ 1 ∀k
and
PDj = e
−µjmin y0 (5)
subject to:
Y −j ≤ e−µj
∞∑
k=0
yk
µkj
k!
≤ Y +j ∀j
0 ≤ yk ≤ 1 ∀k.
Because it is unwieldy to have k range from 0 to ∞ and thus have an infinite number of
optimization variables, we can choose a cutoff value of Kmax and then set any yk≥Kmax to be
either 0 or 1 for the upper or lower bounds, respectively. In this paper, Kmax was set to 9,
although numerically there was little difference for Kmax ≥ 5.
B. Finding error rates
The next step necessary for calculating the rate is to determine the bit error rate on only
the single-photon signals. This can be done in a similar manner. Let bk be the bit error
rate that Eve (or anything else) introduces on signals with k photons present. She can vary
her attacks independently for each photon number here as well. The number of errors that
Bob measured on signals from state j is Ej. Construct bounds, B
±, on the probability that
Bob measures an error given that Alice sent a signal. Note that this is not the same as the
probability of an error given that Bob received a click. The constraints are
B−j ≤ e−µj
∞∑
k=0
bkyk
µkj
k!
≤ B+j . (6)
Additionally, the constraints on the yields still hold. The total program becomes
bmax1 = max b1 (7)
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subject to:
B−j ≤ e−µj
∞∑
k=0
bkyk
µkj
k!
≤ B+j ∀j
Y −j ≤ e−µj
∞∑
k=0
yk
µkj
k!
≤ Y +j ∀j
0 ≤ yk, bk ≤ 1 ∀k.
This is a quadratically-constrained program, due to the ykbk terms, with a linear objective.
With the double-sided nature of the constraints, this computation takes a bit longer than
the simple linear program described above. After calculating b
∗
1, where the
∗ indicates the
optimal value returned from the program, the rate formula (Eq. 1) can be computed and
the length of the secret key and rate of key generation can be determined for any set of
measurements generated in a QKD session. Details of this calculation and the protocol used
to create this key rate (Eq. 1) can be found in a forthcoming paper.
III. GLOBAL SEARCH OVER PROTOCOL PARAMETERS GIVEN SYSTEM
PARAMETERS
In order to find the optimal protocol parameters, a simulation of the particular protocol is
done with a set of system parameters. Some of the parameters are relatively straightforward.
The security parameter was set at 10−7 except when testing the effects of its change. The
dark count probability y0 included both detector dark counts and background counts. The
values used were from 10−5 to 10−8. This is the probability of a dark count being detected
in the place of one signal. For example, if the combined dark and background rate was
100 Hz and the system operated at 10 MHz with no windowing the dark count would be
y0 = 10
−5. The session length is also expressed in terms of number of signals. The number
of signals sent ranged from 107 up to close to 1013. At a rate of 10 MHz, the sessions could
last anywhere from one second to a few days. Most simulations used a session length of
1010, which is about 15 minutes at 10 MHz. The error rate for dark counts was set at 50%.
For all other numbers of photons in the signal the bit error rate was a fixed value, ranging
from 0% to 5%. That is to say that the true values (as opposed to the bounds found in
(Eq. 7)) are b0 = .5 and bk>0 =
1−V
2
, where V is the visibility. We also need to define the
channel transmission efficiency. The simulations used a simple beamsplitter channel with
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transmission efficiency η. This assumption is only for simulating the channel; Bob does not
make any assumptions on the channel when performing the decoy state analysis.
Once these parameters are set, many simulations are done that range over the protocol
parameters. The bulk of the simulations used three signal states; of which one was the
vacuum state (µ = 0). The remainder used four states. There are thus four parameters, the
signal intensity for the two non-vacuum states and two parameters for the three probabilities
of occurrence. Using sample system parameters, many simulations of the rate of key growth
were done to search the protocol parameter space. The result was that the rate function
appeared convex. The only exception was with a different physical system that will be
discussed below; that system had a bimodal rate function. The remaining searches to find
optimum protocols used standard convex optimization techniques (the objective function
used contains linear and quadratically-constrained programs).
For example, with system parameters:  = 10−7, N = 1010, V = 98%, y0 = 2 × 10−6,
and η = 10−3, the optimal protocol is found to have the three signal intensity values
(0, 0.063, 0.655) occurring with probabilities (1%, 2.75%, 96.25%). The rate of this proto-
col is 9.99621× 10−5 which means that the length of the secret key generated is 999, 621.
Some basic features of this example are general for all optimal protocols. The first to
note is that one of the signal intensities is 0. The vacuum state is always an optimal state
to use (with three or more levels). It typically has a small probability less than 5%. The
next state also has a low probability and a weak signal intensity. The last state has a high
probability and a high intensity. This high state does the main work of transmitting the
secret key, whereas the lower signal intensities characterize the channel. In fact, such a large
share of the key comes from the high signal intensity that any key generated from the weak
signal intensity can be ignored (with only slight adjustment in the optimal protocol and
secret bit rate). For the rest of the simulations the high signal state will be assumed to be
the only key generating signal.
IV. EFFECTS OF SYSTEM PARAMETERS ON THE OPTIMAL PROTOCOL
With an algorithm for finding the optimal protocol parameters and the associated rate
for a given set of system parameters, the effect of the system parameters on the optimal rate
can be examined.
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Semi-log plot of the effects of the session length on the secret key production
rate. The following system parameters are fixed for these simulations: dark count probability
y0 = 2 × 10−6, security parameter  = 10−7, visibility V = 98%, and the quantum channel was
modeled as a beamsplitter channel with transmission probability η = 10−3. Finite statistic effects
(primarily bounds on the single photons and their bit error rate not being tight) lead to a smaller
rate for smaller N , but these effects become negligible as the session length is increased beyond
1012, corresponding to nearly a billion received detections.
A. Session length
Increasing the session length effects the rate in two ways. Most clearly it gives Bob
additional chances to detect signals and lengthens the raw key and so lengthens the final
key. It also increases the rate of final key production per signal sent by Alice. This is due to
a tightening of the confidence bounds used in the optimizations. This rate increase effects all
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Semi-log plot of the secret key production rate vs. the channel loss for
many values of session length N from the best rate with N = 1012 down to N = 107. For short
distances (small loss) there is little effect on the rate, but the effect grows much larger at long
distances since the amount of count statistics that Bob can gather is on the order of Nη. For every
order of magnitude increase in N , the minimum η should decrease by an order of magnitude and
the maximum channel loss should therefore increase by 10 dB, but it is quickly damped by other
effects. Fixed system parameters are y0 = 2× 10−6,  = 10−7, and V = 98%.
protocols and so it shows in an increase of the optimal rate. The main effect on the optimal
protocol is to increase the probability of the highest intensity signal when the session length
starts out large. The effects of the session length on the rate and probability are displayed
in graphs (Figs. 1, 2). Generally, the product Nη needs to at least 105 to have enough
statistics for successfully producing key. The increase in the rate and probability of sending
the highest intensity signal tends to asymptote around N ≈ 1013 (Fig. 3).
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Semi-log plot of the probability that the high intensity (key-encoding) decoy
state. As the number of counts due to the weaker states increase and the bounds get tighter, a
higher fraction of the total signals can be used on the high intensity state. Fixed system parameters
are y0 = 2× 10−6,  = 10−7, V = 98%, and η = 30 dB.
B. Security parameter
The security parameter effects the rate in a similar manner. As the security parameter is
decreased, the confidence bounds tighten and the optimal rate increases. Fig. 4 shows the
small effect of the security parameter on the rate. Perhaps most interesting is the relative
stability over nine orders of magnitude.
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Semi-log plot of the limited effect of the security parameter on the rate.
The rate is quite stable over nine orders of magnitude. Fixed system parameters are N = 1010,
y0 = 2× 10−6, V = 98%, and η = 30 dB.
C. Dark Counts
The dark count rate is the parameter that most determines how far you can conduct
QKD. In other words, fixing all other parameters except the transmission coefficient (η) the
value of y0 is the most important parameter to finding the smallest η with a positive rate.
As the transmission parameter decreases, the number of counts due to signals from Alice
decreases but the number due to dark counts does not change. So the proportion of counts
due to dark counts increases. Since dark counts have an error rate of 50%, this increases
the error rate of the raw key significantly. Even with infinite statistics, the secret key rate
vanishes when the error rate reaches about 11%. In simulations with reasonable parameters,
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Semi-log plot of the effect of dark counts on the rate for various amounts
of channel loss from low effect at a loss of 10 dB down to 30 dB. The rate has been normalized
by η. There is very little negative effect for the small y0 and small channel loss domain, but the
effect dominates in the opposite domain. Fixed system parameters are N = 1010,  = 10−7, and
V = 98%.
the smallest η was consistently between two and three orders of magnitude larger than the
dark count rate. The effect of various dark count rates are shown in graph (Fig. 5, 6). The
dark counts have some effect on the protocol. The lower signal state has to slightly increase
intensity so that the dark count noise won’t wash out the difference between the low state
and the vacuum state. However, most of the effect is indirectly due to increasing the effective
error rate (Fig. 7).
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FIG. 6: (Color online) Semi-log plot of the rate vs. the channel loss (dB) for various dark counts
from the best performing y0 = 2×10−8 down to y0 = 2×10−5. The dark count rate severely limits
the maximum distance (minimum η) achievable. Fixed system parameters are N = 1010,  = 10−7,
and V = 98%.
D. System visibility
The error rate has the largest effect on which protocol is the optimal protocol, particularly
the value of the high state intensity. The secret key rate is also effected by the error rate
because the amount of error correction is determined by the error rate (as long as the
transmission probability is not within two orders of magnitude as the dark counts). The
part of the privacy amplification due to errors is also mainly determined by the error rate.
See Fig. 8 for the optimal rate and the optimal high intensity state. Fitting to the curve
gives an approximate formula µhigh ≈ e−15(1−V ). For larger visibility errors, the ability to
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FIG. 7: (Color online) Semi-log plot of the best bound on the single-photon signal bit error rate
(b∗1) as a function of the dark counts for visibilities V = 95% through V = 99%. As the dark count
probability becomes a significant fraction of η, b1 increases dramatically and the secret bit rate
drops. Fixed system parameters are N = 1010,  = 10−7, and η = 30 dB.
bound b1 with the quadratic program is more important. Without the optimization, one
must use the worst-case assumption that all the errors observed were errors on SPS. See Fig.
9 for a comparison of the two methods.
E. Channel transmission efficiency
The transmission coefficient has an effect on the rate but not much on the protocol. See
Figs. 10 and 11. The rate scales linearly with η, R = O (η). This is the main point in
favor of decoy states. Without decoy states, the optimal signal intensity must scale with
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FIG. 8: (Color online) Plot of the optimal µhigh for various amounts of channel loss from the best
performing 10dB loss down to 30 dB loss. There is some effect due to the loss, but a much larger
effect due to the increase in the visibility can be seen. Fixed system parameters are N = 1010,
 = 10−7, and y0 = 2× 10−6.
the transmission efficiency to yield a positive secret bit rate [20]. With µ = O (η), then
R = O (η2). With decoy states, the signal intensity (of the high state) shouldn’t scale
with η, (µhigh = O (1)). In practice there is still a slight logarithmic dependence on the
transmission efficiency. See Fig. 11.
F. Detectors
We also did simulations detailing the effects of different detectors in a system. The simu-
lations treated the detectors as a plug-n-play portion of the system. The system was assumed
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FIG. 9: (Color online) Semi-log plot comparison between the worst-case bound of the single-photon
signal bit error rate and the quadratically-constrained optimization. Fixed system parameters are
N = 1010,  = 10−7, y0 = 2× 10−6, and V = 98%.
to have an optical loss of 7 dB and a visibility of 97.68%, which are measured values for a fiber
QKD system developed at LANL. The system was simulated for 15 minutes at 10 MHz, even
if some detectors are capable of much faster operating rates. The three detectors that were
simulated were superconducing nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs), transition-edge
sensor superconducting single-photon detectors (TES) and commercially available InGaAs
avalanche photodiodes (APDs). The SNSPDs had a combined dark count probability per
signal of 1.44× 10−8 and a detector efficiency of 2%. The TES detectors had a background
count probability per signal of 4 × 10−6 (set by blackbody radiation transmitted down the
fiber) and a detector efficiency of 50% after applying a filter. The APDs had a combined
dark count probability per clock cycle of 1.5 × 10−5 and a detector efficiency of 10%. The
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FIG. 10: (Color online) Semi-log plot of the secret key rate as a function of the channel loss
for many visibilities from perfect down to 94%. The rate has the most sensitivity to visibility
until η approaches the dark count rate. Fixed system parameters are N = 1010,  = 10−7, and
y0 = 2× 10−6.
fiber was modeled with a loss of .2 dB/km. The simulations are shown in Fig. 12. The
longest distance acheivable is by the SNSPDs. This is mainly due to their low number of
dark counts per signal. The low detector efficiency of SNSPDs however, leads to a lower
rate for shorter distances. The APDs could not go out as far as either of the other detectors.
The TES detectors have a high detector efficiency and so have a higher rate for most values
of channel distance, but they do not reach quite as far as the SNSPDs.
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FIG. 11: (Color online) Plot of the optimal µhigh as a function of the channel loss for many
visibilities from perfect down to 94%. While the visibility greatly effects the optimal intensity, the
level of channel loss does not, except at very high visibility and a high ratio of the dark count
probability to η. Fixed system parameters are N = 1010,  = 10−7, and y0 = 2× 10−6.
G. Number of levels
All results described before were for three-level decoy state protocols. The number of
decoy levels that can be implemented is only limited by practical considerations and the fact
that increasing the number of levels necessarily decreases the amount of statistics available
for each level. By looking at the effects of the session length, it can be shown that this is
not a big concern until the number of states is an extreme case of tens or hundreds. The
rate increase of using four states instead of three states is shown in Fig. 13 and is practically
nonexistent. The improvement is small with less than a percent difference. The form of
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FIG. 12: (Color online) Semi-log plot of the secret key production rate vs. distance in optical fiber
for a variety of different detectors. The session length is N = 9× 109 and the fiber loss is modeled
as 0.2 dB/km. Additional losses are 7 dB for the receiving optics and efficiencies of 50%, 10%,
and 2% for the TES, APD, and SNSPD detectors. Dark and background count probabilities are
4×10−6, 1.5×10−5, and 1.44×10−8, respectively. Visibility is set at V = 97.68% and the security
parameter is chosen to be  = 10−7.
the optimal four-level protocol is similar to the three-level one as well. Like the previous
protocols, there is a vacuum state and a state with low intensity, both with low probabilities.
The three-level protocol’s high intensity state splits into two high states in the four-level
protocol. The two high states have intensities that straddle that of the three-level protocol
(one intensity is higher and one is slightly lower). Generally, the highest state gets most of
the probability.
For both the three- and the four- level protocols, there was an advantage to only sending
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FIG. 13: (Color online) Semi-log plot of the rate vs. the channel loss comparing 1-level (no de-
coy states), 2-level, 3-level and 4-level protocols. Adding a weak level alone greatly boosts the
performance of the BB84 protocol, and adding a third level (vacuum) raises the rate further. We
have not found any significant difference among optimized 3-level and 4-level protocols, which are
overlapping in this plot. Fixed system parameters are N = 1010,  = 10−7, y0 = 2 × 10−6, and
V = 98%.
information with the high intensity levels and allowing the low intensity and vacuum levels
to be pure decoys. This was not the case with the other two results shown on Fig. 13. With
only one level, that level must send information, and in the two-level protocol both levels
are sending information. As shown in the figure, adding even one decoy level dramatically
protects against the photon-number splitting attacks and significantly improves the maxi-
mum tolerable loss. Adding another level yields the three-level protocol that is the focus
of this paper and an improvement over the two-level protocol. After that, it seems that
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the asymptotic limit is reached very quickly with very little noticeable improvement with a
four-level protocol.
V. UNCERTAINTY IN INTENSITIES
Here we consider how to incorporate uncertainty into the values of the intensities selected
for each level in a decoy state protocol. In practical terms, the mean photon number of a
laser output will never be known exactly, and either the provider or the users of a quantum
key distribution system will have to determine how well-calibrated and stable the intensities
are. We model here uncertainty for the low and high intensity levels but do not consider
perturbations of the vacuum level. We first simulate Alice sending the signals through the
channel and Bob receiving them with the true intensity values. Then, for each value U of
the uncertainty, we minimize according to the program in Eq. 6 four separate times using
a value of µj = (1± U)µj, and taking the worst case of the four results. We previously ran
simulations by modifying both µ values by a fine grain across this range of uncertainty, and
we always found the worst case occurred at the endpoints of the ranges. Intuitively, this
can be seen because only one side of any single inequality from (6) may be tight. Using a
non-extreme value for µ would simply restrict the tight side and thus increase the minimum
value. On the other hand, relaxing the loose side of the inequality will not change the
minimum value. See Fig. 14 for details on how uncertainty in intensities impacts the secret
key rate. In short, a positive rate exists even with relatively large uncertainties, except when
the channel loss is close to the maximum tolerated.
VI. PARTIALLY DISTINGUISHABLE LEVELS
The validity of decoy states and of equations (6) and (7) is contingent on Eve being unable
to guess which signal level Alice sent other than the expected photon number statistics. If she
could distinguish the levels further (due to information leaking into another signal property,
such as polarization), then the variables {yk} could be modified by Eve to be different
values for each level. We must then expand variables {yk} to {yj,k} where j is a label for
each distinguishable level. The linear program in (6) becomes
P Sj = e
−µj minµjy1
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FIG. 14: (Color online) Plot demonstating how an uncertainty in intensity degrades the secret bit
rate. Fixed system parameters are N = 1010,  = 10−7, y0 = 2× 10−6, and V = 98%.
PDj = e
−µj minµjy0 (8)
subject to:
Y −j ≤ e−µj
∞∑
k=0
yj,k
µkj
k!
≤ Y +j ∀j
0 ≤ {yj,k} ≤ 1 ∀j, k.
Now the decoy states contribute no constraints to the optimization. In this case of completely
distinguishable decoy states, the protocol does no better than without decoy states. But
one could imagine a situation where Eve could only probabilistically distinguish among
the decoy states. For example, in a system where the differently encoded bits are created
by four different lasers with fixed optics one might want to add a decoy level with a single
additional laser. This low intensity laser would need to produce a maximally mixed state (in
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FIG. 15: (Color online) Semi-log plot of the rate vs. the channel loss comparing the partially
distinguishable and the undistinguishable decoy state protocols. Fixed system parameters are
N = 1010,  = 10−7, y0 = 2× 10−6, and V = 98%.
polarization or phase) to match the average of the four BB84 states. For signals generated
with either zero or one photons, the high and the low intensity states are indistinguishable.
When more photons are generated, these two sources are partially distinguishable. In this
example, when Eve cannot distinguish between the states, then a common set of {yk}’s are
associated with the signal state. Let us define the probability of indistinguishability as Qj,k.
This creates additional constraints and the linear program becomes
P Sj = e
−µj minµjy1
PDj = e
−µj minµjy0 (9)
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subject to:
Y −j ≤ e−µj
∞∑
k=0
yj,k
µkj
k!
≤ Y +j ∀j
yk ≥ Qj,k yj,k ∀j, k.
(1− yk) ≥ Qj,k (1− yj,k) ∀j, k.
0 ≤ {yj,k} ≤ 1 ∀j, k.
For the example above, Qj,k = 1 when j is the high intensity signal state or the vacuum
state. When j is the low signal intensity state Qj,k becomes:
Q1,k =

1 if k ≤ 1
3
4
if k = 2
2k−2 if k ≥ 3.
(10)
Since the low state isn’t a key bit carrying signal, it can’t have an error rate. This means
that the quadratically-constrained program (Eq. 7) cannot be used. An upper bound on b1
can be found that is still lower than the worst-case situation. The dark count error rate
should be 1
2
with statistical fluctuations. By putting a lower bound on y0 with the linear
program, one can put a lower bound with probability (1− ) that so many errors are due to
dark counts. That reduces the number of errors that could be due to single-photon signals.
Fig. 15 shows how these limitations effect the rate compared to the standard three-level
protocols for the example Q’s.
VII. DISCUSSION
These simulations shed some light on what system parameters are most important to
improve rates and maximum distances. We find that on the order of 105 received detections
are sufficient for a positive secret bit rate with our finite statistics approach, provided that
noise is sufficiently low. The intensities for 3-level decoy state protocols are generally opti-
mized with µ0 = 0 (vacuum) and µ1 ∼ 0.1, while the optimal value for the key-generating
signal intensity is dominated by the noise, with a rough fit of µ2 ∼ e−15(BER). Modifying
the total loss by an order of magnitude results in only minor modifications to these values.
Increasing the security parameter by many orders of magnitude also leads to very minor
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effects, so there is little cost to boosting confidence levels (provided that there are sufficient
statistics collected to bound the single photons and their bit error rate). As expected, dark
counts are the limiting factor for maximizing the distances (or tolerable loss) for a positive
secret bit rate. It is worth noting, however, that an order of magnitude suppression in dark
and background count rates generally adds less than 10 dB to the tolerable loss, unless the
session length is also increased to maintain count statistics. Various imperfections can also
be incorporated into the decoy state analysis, such as not knowing the intensities exactly
or potentially leaking partial information about the levels to an adversary, and all of the
bounds described in this work can be implemented in software to run in real-time.
APPENDIX A: WHY BOUNDS DERIVED FOR STATIONARY CHANNELS
ARE VALID FOR NON-STATIONARY CHANNELS
The bounds created by the linearly- and quadratically-constrained programs were ob-
tained with the assumption that Eve provides a stationary channel characterized by the
parameters {yk, bk}. This assumption is not necessary. We will show that the bounds are
valid in the situation that for each signal Alice sends, Eve chooses one of L channels to
apply (for arbitrary L). The L channels are parameterized by {yk,l, bk,l} and Eve applies
them with frequencies fl, with
∑L
l=1 fl = 1.
1. Yield bounds
In the stationary case, the total number of single-photon signals (SPS) is (p1 N y1) and
the total number of clicks is (N
∑
k pkyk). The inequality for each signal intensity appearing
in the linear program becomes
Y − ≤
∑
k
pk yk ≤ Y +, (A1)
where Y ± are the bounds on the yield C
N
, yk are the variables over which the program is
optimized, and pk is the probability that a signal contains k-photons. Let the functions
that calculate the yield bounds be g−(s, t, ) and g+(s, t, ). Specifically, they provide lower
and upper bounds on the success probability of a binomial trial, given that for t trials the
observed frequency was s
t
. The statement that the true success probability lies between both
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bounds has a confidence of at least (1− )2.
Now, when Eve uses the L channels the true value of y1 becomes
∑
l fl y1,l, the total
number of the SPS becomes (N p1 (
∑
l fl y1,l)) and the total number of clicks become C =
N
∑
k
(∑L
l=0 fl y1,l
)
. The inequalities are:
∑
k
pk yk ≥ g−
(
N
∑
k
(
L∑
l=0
fl y1,l
)
, N, 
)
∑
k
pk yk ≤ g+
(
N
∑
k
(
L∑
l=0
fl y1,l
)
, N, 
)
(A2)
Defining new variables yk,l, g−,l, g+,l such that
∑
l flyk,l = yk,
∑
l fl g−,l = g−(·), and∑
l fl g+,l = g+(·), we can create an equivalent linear program
P = min
L∑
l=1
yk,l (A3)
subject to:∑
l
g−,l ≤
∑
k
∑
l
fl pk yk,l∑
l
g+,l ≥
∑
k
∑
l
fl pk yk,l
yk,l ≥ 0
yk,l ≤ 1 (A4)
Now we can create L fictional linear programs min yk,l subject to:
(g−,l) ≤
∑
k
(
fl pk yk,l
) ≤ (g+,l) .
0 ≤ {yk,l} ≤ 1. (A5)
Since the inequalities in (A5) are stronger that the inequality created by their sum found
in the original program, the polytope of allowable solutions created by the intersection of
the polytope (over all variables) for each program is contained in the polytope of allowable
solutions to (A4). This means that the original program provides a lower bound on the sum
of the solutions to the fictional programs.
y∗1 ≤
∑
l
y∗1,l. (A6)
The fictional programs provide bounds for the L stationary channels. So we have
y∗1,l ≤ fl y∗1,l. (A7)
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Putting (A6) and (A7) together completes the argument
y∗1 ≤
∑
l
fl y
∗
1,l ≤
∑
l
fl y1,l = y1. (A8)
2. Disturbance bounds
In the stationary case, the true value of b1 is simply b1. That can be rewritten to
b1 y1
y1
for positive y1. Defining ck = bk yk as the total probability that a k-photon signal sent from
Alice will result in an erroneous click at Bob, b1 becomes
c1
y1
. The total number of errors is
(N
∑
k pkck). The inequalities of the program are
Y − ≤
∑
k
pk yk ≤ Y +
B− ≤
∑
k
pk bk yk ≤ B+ (A9)
where B± are bounds on each signal intensity’s bit error rate.
Now, when Eve uses the L channels, the true value of b1 is still
c1
y1
, but now c1 =
∑
l fl c1,l.
An upper bound on b1 is
b1 =
∑
l fl c1,l
y1
≤ max{c1}
min{y1}
≤ max{
∑
l fl c1,l}
y∗1
. (A10)
This means that we can find an upper bound on b1, if we can find an upper bound on c1.
We can transform (A9) into an equivalent quadratically-constrained program with the
following inequalities
∑
k
pk yk ≥ g−
((
N
∑
k
∑
l
fl pk yk,l
)
, N, 
)
∑
k
pk yk ≤ g+
((
N
∑
k
∑
l
fl pk yk,l
)
, N, 
)
∑
k
pk ck ≥ g−
((
N
∑
k
∑
l
fl pk ck,l
)
, N, 
)
∑
k
pk ck ≤ g+
((
N
∑
k
∑
l
fl pk ck,l
)
, N, 
)
ck = bk yk. (A11)
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The objective function is still b1, but note that any assignment of variables that maximizes
b1 will also maximize c1 since b1 only appears next to y1 in the inequalities. This can be
proved by contradiction. Assume an assignment of variables that maximizes b1. This implies
that at least one constraint that involves b1 is tight. c1 can only be increased by either
increasing b1 or y1. If b1 can be increased, then it wasn’t maximized. If y1 can be increased,
all inequalities that involve y1 are slack. Since b1 is only in inequalities that involve y1 this is
a contradiction. Making a trade-off such as first decreasing one variable in order to increase
the other can’t work either, since any such trade-off keeps c1 constant.
Now, we can play the same trick as before. Again, the intersection of the allowable
solutions to the L fictional programs is contained in the region (no longer necessarily a
polytope) allowed by (A11). So the maximum of the original program is an upper bound
on the sum of the fictional maximums. c∗1 ≥
∑
l c
∗
1,l. Solving the fictional programs yields
c∗1,l ≥ fl c1,l. (A12)
Combining with the above means that the original program provides an upper bound on
c1 and thus an upper bound on b1.
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